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MARYLAND'S APPLICATION OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IN
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY BIDDING DISPUTES: ELIMINATING
FURTHER CONFUSION
I.

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between general contractors and subcontractors in
the construction industry bidding process! has long presented a
unique problem to the law of contracts. 2 In any multi-level bidding
system, such as construction projects, parties must rely on each other's
estimates in order to accurately submit bids. 3 This places parties at
risk when an error is discovered or one side refuses to perform and
inevitably leads to one party bearing a financial 10ss.4 Recognizing
these risks and seeking to prevent the resulting injustice, courts apply
promissory estoppel,5 among other methods,6 to the construction bidding process. 7 This doctrine has the potential to protect, (1) the general contractor from subcontractors attempting to escape a quoted
price,s and (2) subcontractors from general contractors attempting to
shop for lower estimates after the main contract has been awarded. 9
1. See infra Part ILA
2. JUSTIN SWEET, LEGAL AsPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS § 28.01, at 620 (5th ed. 1994).
3. Id. at 623.
4. See infra Part II.B.
5. Although the term "promissory estoppel" has frequently been labeled a
misnomer, it is widely used to describe the theory that protects unbargained for reliance. Despite Maryland courts' use of the term "detrimental
reliance," this Comment will adhere to the more widely used term "promissory estoppel." E.g., Pavel Enters., Inc. v. AS. Johnson Co., 342 Md. 143,
146 n.1, 674 A2d 521, 523 n.1 (1996) (referring to the theory of promissory estoppel as detrimental reliance).
6. See infra Part N (discussing alternatives to promissory estoppel in solving
bid disputes).
7. See, e.g., Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 759 (Cal. 1958) (applying promissory estoppel to make a subcontractor's bid irrevocable after discovery of an error). See also infra Part IILB for a discussion of the
application of promissory estoppel to the construction industry bidding
process.
8. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
9. See Thomas P. Lambert, Comment, Bid Shopping and Peddling in the Subcontract Construction Industry, 18 UClA L. REv. 389, 405-09 (1965) (noting that
promissory estoppel can be used to bind the general contractor to the subcontractor, not just vice versa); see also infra Part III.B.3.h.
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Although the Court of Appeals of Maryland has adopted the doctrine
of promissory estoppel,Io its application in construction bidding disputes remains unclear. 11 By misunderstanding the rationale behind
the doctrine's use and creating additional requirements,I2 the court
ignored cases interpreting the standard and inappropriately applied
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. I3
This Comment analyzes Maryland's application of promissory estoppel to construction bidding disputes between general contractors and
subcontractors. I4 In order to fully understand and analyze the correct
use of promissory estoppel in construction bidding, Part II of this
Comment examines the bidding process, its unique features, the actors involved, and the difficulties the process poses to contract law. 15
Part III addresses the emergence and evolution of promissory estoppel,I6 both nationally and in Maryland, and its more recent application to the construction bidding scenario. I7 In addition, Part III
analyzes Maryland's misinterpretation of the Restatemenf8 and provides suggestions as to how the Court of Appeals of Maryland can rectify the current situation. 19 Part IV explores the viability of potential
alternatives in establishing a balance between the rights and needs of
general contractors and subcontractors. 2o This Comment concludes
by suggesting that the court of appeals clarify its interpretation of
promissory estoppel, thereby permitting the doctrine's use as a solution to the construction industry's bidding dilemma. 21
II.

CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY BIDDING

As the construction industry employs a unique bidding process
prior to contract formation, it continuously challenges contract law to
respond with innovative solutions. 22 Most disputes involving bidding
arise because of a mistake in a bid or an attempt by a general contraclO.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See infra Part III.A.4.
See infra notes 285-91 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.C.2.
See infra Part III.C.2.
See infra Part II.A (discussion the unique construction industry bidding
process).
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part III.C.2.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
SWEET, supra note 2, at 620.
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tor to "bid shop."23 The most volatile area of this process is the relationship between the general contractor, who manages the project,
and the subcontractors, who complete the parts of the project in
which they specialize. 24 This relationship has led subcontracting to be
labeled the "legal Achilles' heel of the Construction Process."25 Nevertheless, if functioning properly, subcontracting can reduce the costs
of construction by promoting competition among general contractors
and subcontractors, and increase the efficiency of the process through
specialization. 26

A.

The Unique Bidding Process

In the construction industry, contract formation usually occurs
through the bidding process. 27 In virtually all construction projects,
the following three parties are involved: (1) the landowner, project
developer or government agency who requests parties to submit estimates for the construction of the project; (2) the general contractor,
who submits bids on the construction of the entire project; and (3)
the subcontractors, who submit estimates to the general contractor on
a particular part of the project in which they specialize. 28
Given this arrangement, two levels of bids are usually submitted on
all construction projects. 29 At the upper level, the landowner, project
23. BRIAN M. SAMUELS, CONSTRUCTION LAw §§ 6.3-.4, at 69-70 (1996) (giving a
brief description of mistakes and bid shopping in construction industry bidding). For a definition of "bid shopping," see infra note 45 and accompanying text.
24. See id. § 6.2, at 66.
25. SWEET, supra note 2, at 620.
26. See id. (stating that the principal advantage of the subcontracting system is
the resulting improvement in efficiency).
27. SAMUELS, supra note 23, at 66. The award of the contract constitutes the
acceptance of the offer and establishes contractual rights between the
owner or solicitor of bids and the successful general contractor. Id. at 68.
The prices submitted by the subcontractors and other suppliers, which
were relied upon by the general contractor in computing the main bid, are
irrevocable once acceptance occurs. Id. This contrasts with an earlier stage
in the bidding process where a subcontractor's bid may be irrevocable, not
because the main bid was accepted, but because the general contractor relied on the bid under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. See infra notes
193-213 and accompanying text.
28. Maryland Supreme Corp. v. Blake Co., 279 Md. 531, 533-34, 369 A.2d 1017,
1020-21 (1977) (citing John B. Gaides, The "Firm Offer" Problem in Construction Bids and the Need for Promissory Estoppel, 10 WM. & MARy L. REv. 212
(1968)).
29. Michael L. Closen & Donald G. Weiland, The Construction Industry Bidding
Cases: Application of Traditional Contract, Promissory },Stoppel, and Other Theories
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developer, or government agency solicits bids from general contractors. 30 This type of bid includes the estimated cost for the entire project. 3l At the second level, subcontractors submit bids to the general
contractors. 32 These bids contain price estimates for the subcontractor's performance of a specific sub-part of the project paralleling the
subcontractor's area of expertise. 33
Both levels of bid submission are generally initiated when, at the
upper level, the landowner, project developer, or government agency
invites or solicits bids for a project. 34 The method of bid invitation or
solicitation may vary depending on the nature of the project. For example, in Maryland, government agency project bids are solicited by
public notice or invitations for bids,35 while in non-public projects,
owners and developers use whatever method of communication is
available. 36

30.

31.

32.
33.

34.

35.

36.

to the Relations Between General Contractars and Subcontractars, 13 J. MARsHALL
L. REv. 565, 568 (1980).
Id. General contractors, also known as prime contractors, do not actually
perform the work, "but rather coordinate and supervise the project and the
work of each individual subcontractor and supplier." Id.
Id. However, sometimes large projects are broken down into individual segments.ld.
Id.
See SWEET, supra note 2, at 623 (discussing the common use of sub-bids in
the "mechanical specialty trades").
Id. In the private sector, most invitations to potential bidders contain a
statement that the owner reserves the right to accept or reject any bid at its
sole discretion, thereby protecting the owner against liability for improper
rejection of a bid. SAMUELS, supra note 23, at 66.
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-103(c) (1998). This section
states:
(1) A unit shall give public notice of an invitation for bids before
bid opening in accordance with this subsection.
(2) A unit shall give reasonable notice that shall be at least 10 days
before the bid opening.
(3) The unit shall publish notice in the Contract Weekly at least 20
days before bid opening if: (i) the procurement officer reasonably
expects bid prices to exceed $25,000 ....
(4) In addition to any notice required under this subsection, a unit
may publish notice of an invitation for bids: (i) in the Contract
Weekly ... (ii) on a bid board; or (iii) in a newspaper, periodical,
or trade journal.
Id.
See Closen & Weiland, supra note 29, at 569 (stating that owners and developers use advertisements, trade newspapers, magazines, individual invitations to known contractors, and word-of-mouth to solicit bids).
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Once notice of the project occurs, interested subcontractors - either on their own initiative or at a general contractor's request - prepare an estimate on a specific part of the project and then submit a
bid to one or many general contractors bidding on the project. 37
Commonly, interested subcontractors are required to submit written,
sealed bids,38 which must arrive at a specified time. The subcontractors' original bids are followed by price quotes, which are usually relayed only a few hours before the main bid for the project is due. 39
The general contractor evaluates the many bids it receives from the
subcontractors for every part of the project and compiles a total bid
for the soliciting party based on the individual quotes. 40 Mter receiving bids from a number of general contractors, the party soliciting
bids awards the contract to the lowest reputable bidderY

B.

Bid Shopping and Bid Peddling

Common law left the general contractor and subcontractor unprotected from practices detrimental to both parties,42 as both remained
uncommitted until the general contractor's formal acceptance of the
sulrbid. 43 These practices included "bid shopping" and "bid peddling."44 Bid shopping occurs when the general contractor uses a low
bid already received to induce other subcontractors into submitting
lower bids,45 while bid peddling occurs when subcontractors attempt
37. SAMUELS, supra note 23, at 67.
38. See, e.g., Pavel Enters., Inc. v. A.S.Johnson Co., 342 Md. 143, 162, 674 A.2d
521,530 (1996) (stating that an offer under seal is a substitute for consideration to make an offer firm).
39. SAMUELS, supra note 23, at 67. To prevent a general contractor from using
a quoted price to negotiate lower sub-bids, subcontractors submit their bids
as late as practicable. [d. This last minute rush is the reason for many mistakes by both general contractors and subcontractors in the calculation of
bids. SWEET, supra note 2, at 625.
40. SWEET, supra note 2, at 623-24.
4l. SAMUELS, supra note 23, at 68. Factors considered in awarding a contract,
other than the price of the bid, are the reputation of the lowest bidder and
its ability to perform quality work. [d.
42. See, e.g., infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
43. Lambert, supra note 9, at 389 (citing 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS §§ 22-94 (rev. ed. 1963); see also infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
44. Lambert, supra note 9, at 389.
45. [d. at 394. These post-award negotiation tactics are often referred to as "bid
chopping" and "bid chiseling" and may even be used before the main bid is
submitted. SWEET, supra note 2, at 625.
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to under bid the submitted prices of known competitors in order to
obtain the subcontract from the general contractor. 46
Bid shopping and bid peddling have long been recognized as unethical by construction industry trade organizations, as these practices
undermined the public benefits of the bidding processY Although
considered unethical, these practices remain common and have detrimental effects. 48 The consequences of these practices can be quite
severe to the owner or developer of a project, the general contractor,
the subcontractors, and the public. 49 For example, "[w]hen successful
this practice places a profit squeeze on subcontractors, impairing their
incentive and ability to perform to their best ... ."50 Therefore, it is
understandable why a remedy such as promissory estoppel51 is necessary in such an environment to inhibit these harmful practices and
bring stability and predictability to the process. 52
III.

PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

The doctrine of promissory estoppel was created to eliminate any
injustice that may result when a party relies on a promise unsupported
by a binding contract. 53 Courts often perceive a promisor's refusal to
perform as an injustice, particularly when a person incurs substantial
46. Lambert, supra note 9, at 394.
47. See SAMUELS, supra note 23, at 69. These practices are considered unethical
to the point that if a general contractor participates in bid shopping, it may
lose its right to hold the subcontractor to its bid. This is generally the remedy given as there is no judicial remedy to date. Id.
48. See SWEET, supra note 2, at 625.
49. Id. Subcontractors assert that other subcontractors who bid peddle save
considerable expenses by not preparing their own bids and, therefore, are
at a distinct advantage. Id. The practice of bid shopping compels subcontractors to wait until the last minute to submit their sub-bids to the general
contractor, which arguably is the cause for many mistakes. Id.; see also supra
note 39. Also, because subcontractors feel they must pad, or "puff," their
bids to be in a better position for post-award negotiations, an inflated bid is
often relied upon by the general contractor. SWEET, supra note 2, at 625.
This has the end result of raising the cost of the project for the owner or
the public. Id.
50. Southern Cal. Acoustics Co. v. C.V. Holder, Inc., 456 P.2d 975, 981 n.7 (Cal.
1969) (noting that the purpose of the California statute at issue was to protect the public and subcontractors from the results of bid shopping and bid
peddling subsequent to the award of a contract).
51. See infra Part III for a discussion of promissory estoppel.
52. See infra Part III.B.2.
53. See generally L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue,Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE LJ. 52 (1936) (discussing the reason for protection
of the reliance interest).
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expense in reliance on a promise. 54 Instead of denying enforcement
for lack of consideration, courts enforce the promise if necessary to
avoid injury to the party who justifiably relied on the promise by invoking recovery under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 55
This doctrine has been described as "an attempt by the courts to
keep remedies abreast of increased moral consciousness of honest
and fair representations in all business dealings."56 The flexibility of
the doctrine is invaluable in the unique situation of the construction
industry bidding process57 and can, if properly applied, be used as a
method to protect both general contractors and subcontractors
against risks. 58

A.

The Doctrine's Origins

Derived from several court opinions that did not adhere to the
traditional contract requirement of consideration,59 the doctrine of
promissory estoppel is one of the most significant developments in
contract law of the twentieth century.60 In order to avoid the injustice
that would result by application of traditional contract theory, modern courts created ~e legal fiction of promissory estoppel. 61

54. See Michael B. Metzger & MichaelJ. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Reliance
on Illusory Promises, 44 Sw. LJ. 841, 848-49 (1990).
55. Id. at 848; if. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT § 4, at 88 (1974)
(concluding that the use of promissory estoppel as a substitute for the orthodox contract law requirement of bargained-for consideration has led to
the death of the contract).
56. People's Nat'l Bank of Little Rock v. Linebarger Constr. Co., 240 S.W.2d 12,
16 (Ark. 1951) (holding that the defendant was estopped from denying
promissory representations contained in a letter to a bank).
57. See supra Part I1.A.
58. Janine McPeters Murphy, Promissory Estoppel: Subcontractars' Liability in Construction Bidding Cases, 63 N.C. L. REv. 387, 394-95 (1985); see also infra Part
I1LB.3.b.
59. See JOHN D. CALAMAru & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 6-1
(3d ed. 1987) (citing Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle from
Precedents, 50 MICH. L. REv. 639 (1952)).
60. See generally Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation ofPromissoryEstoppe~ 81 COLUM. L. REv. 52 (1981) (noting the proliferation of promissory estoppel in the twentieth century).
61. Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppe~ 49 HAsTINGS LJ. 1191, 1196 (1998).
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Historical Roots

Promissory estoppel has historical roots in both the common-law
action of assumpsif>2 and early equity decisions. 63 Its beginnings followed the development of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 64 Nonetheless, these two theories are distinctly different. 65 Traditionally,
equitable estoppel has been limited to defensive uses 66 and invoked
only where one party falsely represented a fact and another party suffered injury as a result of relying on that false representation. 67 In
such cases, courts following this doctrine bar the party who made the
false representation from contradicting it. 68 As this doctrine did not
apply solely by a promisee's reliance on a promise, but rather by reliance on a fraudulently made promise,69 a need for the doctrine of
promissory estoppel arose. 70
62. See SAMUEL J. STOLjAR, A HISTORY OF CONTRACT AT COMMON LAw 37-38
(1975) (stating that at early common law, when a person incurred injury by
justifiably relying on another, assumpsit became the prime action for enforcing the informal contract).
63. See James Barr Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARv. L. REv. 1, 14-15
(1888) (explaining that equity gave relief to a plaintiff who incurred detriment on the faith of a defendant's promise).
64. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 59, § 6-2. The doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes a person by his act, conduct, or silence, from asserting a right
he normally had, when it is his duty to act. BLACK'S LAw DICnONARY 538
(6th ed. 1990).
65. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 59, § 6-2.
66. Robert Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78
YALE LJ. 343, 377-78 (1969).
67. See Clark v. Nat'l Aid Life Ass'n, 57 P.2d 832 (Okla. 1936). There, the plaintiff argued equitable estoppel to estop the defendant from denying the existence of an insurance contract. Id. at 833. The defendant responded
arguing that because plaintiff was in poor health at the time of contracting,
and a valid contract was conditioned on plaintiff's certification of good
health, there was no valid contract. Id. at 834. The defendant's agent, however, falsely represented to the plaintiff that the health certification provision did not apply. Id. at 833. The plaintiff, in good faith, relied upon the
agent's misrepresentation in transferring his insurance to the defendant,
resulting in estoppel of defendant's denial of the contract. Id. at 834.
68. See id. at 835.
69. See Barnett v. Walfolk, 140 S.E.2d 466, 472 (W. Va. 1965) (recognizing that
"there can be no estoppel in the 'absence of fraud or intentional wrong' on
the part of the person to be estopped") (quoting Spradling v. Spradling,
190 S.E. 537, 541 (W. Va. 1937)).
70. See generally Henderson, supra note 66.
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The Birth of Promissory Estoppel

Originally, a promise was unenforceable absent consideration, even
if the promisee relied on the promise detrimentally.71 Courts argued
that the presence of consideration was necessary to ensure that a person made the promise after sufficient deliberation. 72 Courts began,
however, to make specific exceptions for certain donative promises,73
as they recognized the reliance interest needed protection. 74 Donative promises were often enforced as long as "the underlying transaction could be artificially construed as a bargain."75 Nonetheless,
despite these exceptions, unbargained for promises were generally
unenforceable. 76

3.

Evolution of Promissory Estoppel in the Restatements of
Contracts

a.

The Promulgation of Section 90 by Restatement (First)

The doctrine of promissory estoppel was formally introduced into
contract law by Professor Samuel Williston through the creation of the
Restatement (First) of Contracts ("Restatement (First),,).77 Notwithstanding
the emphasis of the Restatement (First) on the bargain theory of consideration,78 its section 90 changed contract law to allow unbargained-for
71. See CAi.AMARI & PERILLO, supra note 59, § 6-1. Generally, the presence of
consideration was a necessity to valid contract formation to "insure that the
promise was made with sufficient deliberation." Id.
72. See id.
73. See id. § 6-2; see also Jay M. Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel Article, 61
FORDHAM L. REv. 303, 304 (1992). These exceptions were created to avoid
injustice for promises made in contemplation of marriage, promises made
between relatives, gratuitous promises to give land, and charitable subscriptions. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 59, § 6-2.
74. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 53, at 52. The promisee should be afforded
protection under the law where his position changed based on reliance of
the promise. Id.
75. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 14 (1979)
(citing Siegel v. Spear & Co., 138 N.E. 414 (N.Y. 1923)).
76. Id.
77. Section 90 provided: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character
on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
78. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L.
REv. 640,657 (1982) (noting that the Restatement (First) adhered to the bargain theory in terms, but limited it in section 90).
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promises to be binding. 79 However, the section's authors intended it
to enforce relied upon donative promises, rather than promises in a
commercial context. 80 Section 90's definition of promissory estoppel
required a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to
lead to the promisee's act or forbearance. 81 Not only must there be a
promise, but the reliance of the promisee must have been of a "definite and substantial character."82
h.

The Revision of Section 90 and Creation of Section 87 by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts

As a result of a number of decisions concerning promissory estoppel and the confusion and problems created,83 section 90 was reformulated by the promulgation of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
("Restatement (Second),,).84 The requirement in the Restatement (First)
that the action in reliance be of "definite and substantial character"
was eliminated in the Restatement (Second).85 Language was added that
permitted flexibility of remedy by enforcing a promise reasonably relied upon to the extent of the reliance. 86 Therefore, although section
79. See Charles E. Clark, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 YALE LJ. 643,
656 (1933) (noting that section 90 is notorious "as representing some modification of the ancient rules of consideration").
80. GILMORE, supra note 55, at 73.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See infra Part III.B.1; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90
(1932). In order to meet this requirement the promise must be one that
contemplated and induced a particular act in reliance. Id.
84. The new section of the Restatement (Second) entitled "Promise Reasonably
Inducing Action or Forbearance" states:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third
person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
(2) A charitable subscription or a marriage settlement is binding
under Subsection (1) without proof that the promise induced action or forbearance.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS § 90 (1979).
85. Id. However, comment b to section 90 states that the definite and substantial nature of the reliance remains one of the factors to be considered and,
although not needed in charitable subscription cases, must be present in
cases of firm offers and guarantees. Id., cmt. b.
86. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 59, § 6-6. The Restatement (Second) thus
provides not only for flexibility as to the substantive doctrine itself but also
for a flexible approach regarding remedies. See id.; see also id. § 6-1.
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90 originally applied only to enforce gratuitous promises,87 the broad~
ened scope of section 90 allowed courts to apply promissory estoppel
to other situations. 88
In addition to changing section 90, the American Law Institute, in
response to a prominent construction case89 and seeking to make
promissory estoppel more readily applicable to the construction bid~
ding process, created section 87(2).90 This new section, entitled the
"option contract,"91 allowed promissory estoppel to apply to reliance
on unaccepted offers where the drafters believed application of sec~
tion 90 would be inappropriate. 92 Section 87(2) provides that reli~
87. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 53, at 52. Gratuitous promises are defined "as
[ ] promise[s] not supported by consideration." BLACK'S LAw DICnONARY
1229 (7th ed. 1999).
88. See, e.g., Universal Computer Sys., Inc. v. Med. Servs. Ass'n, 628 F.2d 820,
824-25 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that a promise by an insurer's employee to
pick up a bid proposal, which the company relied upon to its detriment,
was enforceable on the basis of promissory estoppel); Mesa Petroleum Co.
v. Coniglio, 629 F.2d 1022, 1027 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying promissory estoppel to estop a corporation from denying the promise to pay a joint venture corporation pursuant to a promissory note). But seeJames Baird Co. v.
Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933) (holding that a merchant was
not liable for damages under promissory estoppel for withdrawing an offer
to a general contractor of prices for linoleum after the general contractor
had made a bid on the basis of the prices offered).
89. See infra Part I1I.B.2.
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 (1979). This section states:
(1) An offer is binding as an option contract if it (a) is in writing
and signed by the offeror, recites a purported consideration for the
making of the offer, and proposes an exchange in fair terms within
a reasonable time; or (b) is made irrevocable by statute. (2) An
offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the offeree
before acceptance and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding as an option contract to the extent necessary to
avoid injustice.
[d.
91. [d.
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87, cmt. e (1981) (stating that section 87 extends the application of section 90 to reliance on an unaccepted
offer with qualifications where it would be inappropriate to apply section
90); see also James Baird Co., 64 F.2d at 346 (refusing to apply section 90 of
the Restatement (First) to a construction bidding dispute). Section 87(2) was,
in essence, a codification of the holding of Drennan v. Star Paving Co. See
infra notes 16~8 and accompanying text. In fact, the situation in Drennan
was used as an illustration in the comments to section 87(2) of the Restatement (Second). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87, illus. 6 (1981).
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ance on an offer may create an option contract that precludes
revocation even if the offeror has not actually promised to keep the
offer open. 93 Thus, the subcontractor's bid contains a subsidiary implied promise to hold the bid open. 94 Reliance on this implied promise to keep a sub-bid open occurs when the general contractor uses
the subcontractor's bid in computing the main bid. 95 Therefore, this
new section creates an exception to the traditional rule that an offeror
remains free to revoke an offer absent a bargain to keep the offer
open. 96
c.

The Differences Between Sections 90 and 87(2) Limit the Situations Where
Each is Applicable

Unlike section 90, the application of section 87 (2) requires reliance
of a "definite and substantial character."97 This level of reliance is
similar to that required under the original section 90,98 but is not necessary under section 90 of the Restatement (Second).99 In addition, while
application of section 90 creates an enforceable contract,lOO section
87 (2) only makes an offer irrevocable. lol Therefore, a general contractor's reliance on the implied subsidiary promise makes the bid irrevocable, but does not yet create a contract between the
subcontractor and the general contractor. 102
Despite the drafters' intention that section 87(2) replace the use of
section 90 in construction bidding cases, few courts have actually ap93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(2) (1979).
94. See id.
95. See id. This concept results from the marriage of two contract theories: the
option contract and promissory estoppel. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87, Reporter's Note (1979); see
also Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel
in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE LJ. 1249, 1261-66 (1996) (discussing
the development of section 87(2».
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 cmt. e. The comment states
that under certain circumstances the promisee may have to "undergo substantial expense, or undertake substantial commitments, or forego alternatives, in order to put himself in a position to accept by either promise or
performance." Id. This reliance must be foreseeable as well as substantial.
Id.
98. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 84.
101. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
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plied section 87(2).103 Nonetheless, a majority of courts apply the reasoning behind section 87(2) to construction bidding disputes 104 by
citing section 90 and the analyses of later case law.lOs
4.

The Birth of Promissory Estoppel in Maryland

Originally, promissory estoppel was a narrow exception to the general requirement of consideration and applied only in cases dealing
with "gratuitous agencies and bailments."106 The development of
promissory estoppel in Maryland mirrors its development nationwide. 107 In 1854, Gittings v. Mayhew 108 first addressed the doctrine of
promissory estoppel in Maryland. In Gittings, a charitable fund incurred advances, expenses, and liabilities as a result of voluntary subscriptions to the fund used to benefit the community for the
construction of a building. 109 The court noted in dictum that
promises are obligatory, provided the advances, expenses, and liabilities incurred by the fund are authorized by fair and reasonable reliance on the promiseYo The dictum in Gittings,lll together with a
103. Pavel Enters., Inc. v. AS. Johnson Co., 342 Md. 143, 159,674 A2d 521, 529
(1996). Although section 87(2) has been in existence for over 18 years, no
court has based a decision on it. Gregory Maggs, Ipse Dixit: The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts and the Modern Development of Contract Law, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 508, 521, 544-46 (1998). In fact, one study has found that
only 21 cases even cite section 87(2). Id. Although none of these cases
rejected the section or referred to it negatively, they failed to rely solely on
it in reaching their holdings. Id. at 521.
104. See infra note 190.
105. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
106. Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel andJudicial Method, 97 HARv. L. REv. 678,
680 (1983); see also Pavel Enters., 342 Md. at 164, 674 A2d at 531-32 (stating
that the early cases which applied promissory estoppel mainly involved the
enforcement of charitable pledges).
107. SeeJason R. Scherr, The Maryland Survey: 1995-1996, 56 MD. L. REv. 711, 719
(1997) (discussing the origins of promissory estoppel in Maryland).
108. 6 Md. 113 (1854).
109. Id. at 131-32. The term "subscription" is defined as "the affixing [of] one's
signature to any document ... for the purpose ... of adopting its terms as
one's own expressions." BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1427 (6th ed. 1990). In
the instant case, the subscription is analogous to a promise.
110. Id. at 131-32. The judgment of the lower court upholding the validity of
the pledge was reversed on the ground that the plaintiff was not the proper
person to bring a claim. Id. at 134. The validity of the pledge was only
discussed because it was of interest to the community and had been addressed by counsel. Id. at 130.
111. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
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number of subsequent decisions dealing more directly with the issue
of reliance by the court of appeals,112 became the law in Maryland.
Eventually, the court in Maryland National Bank v. United Jewish Appeal Federation of Greater Washington, Inc. 113 expressly adopted section
90 of the Restatement (First)Y4 The court, however, held that the plaintiff did not prove reliance as required by the doctrine of promissory
estoppel. l15 In that case, an individual pledged $200,000 to the
United Jewish Appeal Federation of Greater Washington, Inc. (UJA) ,
which was never paid. 116 The court, in applying the Restatement
(First),117 held that the defendant's pledge to a charitable institution
was unenforceable as a gratuitous promise, because the UJA had not
acted in a "definite and substantial" manner in reliance on the
pledge. 118 By following the reasoning of earlier Maryland courts, the
court of appeals held that the Maryland law regarding the enforcement of charitable pledges and subscriptions to charitable organizations was the same as that expressed in section 90 of the Restatement
(First)Y9

112. 286 Md. 274, 407 A.2d 1130 (1979); see, e.g., Am. Univ. v. Collins, 190 Md.
688, 59 A.2d 333 (1948); Sterling v. Cushwa & Sons, 170 Md. 226, 183 A.
593 (1936); Erdman v. Trustees Eutaw Methodist Protestant Church, 129
Md. 595, 99 A. 793 (1917). For a historical development of this doctrine
through these cases, see Maryland Nat'l Bank, 286 Md. at 281-84,407 A.2d at
1134-36.
113. 286 Md. 274, 407 A.2d 1130 (1979).
114. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
115. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 286 Md. at 289,407 A.2d at 1138.
116. Id. at 275, 407 A.2d at 1131. At the time of the decedent's death, $133,500
remained unpaid on his initial pledge. Id. at 276, 407 A.2d at 1131.
117. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
118. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 286 Md. at 289, 407 A.2d at 1138. The outcome undoubtedly would have been different under section 90 of the Restatement
(Second), which eliminated the requirement that the reliance be of a "definite and substantial" character. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
The court noted that the UJA made allocations to various beneficiary organizations based upon pledges it received, but did not incur liabilities based
on those allocations. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 286 Md. at 277,290,407 A.2d at
1132, 1138. The decedent's failure to fully pay his pledge did not thwart
any allocation by UJA, and they did not change their position in reliance on
the subscription. Id. at 289, 407 A.2d at 1138. Therefore, the court stated,
"it [did] not appear that injustice [could] be avoided only by enforcement
of the promise." Id. at 290, 407 A.2d at 1138.
119. See id. at 281, 407 A.2d at 1134 (discussing Gittings v. Mayhew, 6 Md. 113
(1854»; see also supra note 77 for the text of the Restatement (First).
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Notwithstanding this early adoption of promissory estoppel for application in disputes over charitable pledges,120 there remained an initial degree of uncertainty in Maryland as to its specific requirements
and its utility in other areas. 121 One case that demonstrates this confusion is Kiley v. First National Bank oj Maryland. 122 There, in a suit
against a bank for closing a depositors' account, the court held that
the depositors had failed to show, under the doctrine of promissory
estoppel, sufficient detrimental reliance on the bank's alleged
promises not to vary the terms of the account or close it. 123 In denying the plaintiffs' remedy, the court stated that it was unclear whether
Maryland continued to follow the "more stringent formulation of
promissory estoppel, as set forth in the original Restatement of Contracts, or now follows the more flexible view found in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts."124 Therefore, the court analyzed the case
under both the Restatement (First) and Restatement (Second).125
Maryland courts continued to be confused over this doctrine as evidenced by the decision of the court of special appeals in Snyder v.
Snyder. 126 By erroneously imposing the additional requirement of
fraudulent conduct on the part of the promisor,127 the Snyder court
refused to apply promissory estoppel to enforce an oral contract trans-

120. See supra note lO8-lO.
121. See, e.g., Chesapeake Supply & Equip. Co. v. Manitowoc Eng'r Corp., 232
Md. 555, 566, 194 A2d 624, 630 (1963) (merely acknowledging the existence of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, but not mentioning the doctrine's standards); Kiley v. First Nat'l Bank of Maryland, lO2 Md. App. 317,
649 A2d 1145 (1994); Snyder v. Snyder, 79 Md. App. 448, 558 A2d 417
(1989).
122. 102 Md. App. 317, 649 A2d 1145 (1994).
123. Id. at 337, 649 A2d at 1154. The plaintiffs sought compensation and punitive damages for the bank's alleged breach of contract and tortious conduct
by imposing service charges on their account, altering the terms of their
account, and subsequently closing their account. Id. at 321, 649 A.2d at
1146.
124. Id. at 337, 649 A2d at 1154; see supra Part IILA3.
125. Kiley, 102 Md. App. at 336, 649 A.2d at 1154. The Kiley court noted that
whether Maryland followed the Restatement (First) or Restatement (Second) did
not affect the outcome of the case. Id. at 336, 649 A2d at 1154.
126. 79 Md. App. 448, 558 A.2d 412, cert. denied, 317 Md. 511, 564 A.2d 1182
(1989). Contra Pavel Enters., Inc. v. AS. Johnson Co., 342 Md. 143, 674
A2d 521 (1995).
127. Snyder, 79 Md. App. at 458, 558 A2d at 417. This additional requirement
demonstrates a potential confusion between promissory estoppel and the
doctrine of equitable estoppel. See supra notes 64-68.
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ferring property between a wife and a husband. 128 In Snyder, pursuant
to an oral agreement, the husband refused to re-title a home that he
purchased with his wife before they married. 129 One of the arguments
advanced by the wife, to overcome the Statute of Frauds, was that the
husband was estopped from asserting a Statute of Frauds defense. 130
The court stated that" [0] ne of the most significant factors in determining whether justice demands enforcement of a promise is whether
the promisor acted unconscionably."131 Notwithstanding the fact that
the Restatement (First), as quoted by the court, did not require a showing of fraud, the court held that to invoke promissory estoppel, the
promisor must have no intention of fulfilling the promise at the time
it was made. 132
The court affirmed its misapplication of promissory estoppel in
Friedman & Fuller, P. C. v. Funkhouser. 133 There, the plaintiff, defendant's former employer, sued the defendant for breach of an employment contract. 134 In an attempt to overcome the Statute of Frauds
defense, the employer invoked the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 135
The court of special appeals held, however, that for promissory estoppel to prevail, not only must all the elements be met, but also, following the precedent of Snyder, evidence must demonstrate that the
promise was fraudulently made. 136 Therefore, because it was not clear
the employer had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the employee's actions were fraudulent, the court reversed the
128. Snyder, 79 Md. App. at 458, 461, 558 A.2d at 417, 419. Here, the plaintiff
attempted to use promissory estoppel as a means for overcoming the Statute of Frauds violation that occurred with an oral promise to transfer property. Id. at 451, 558 A.2d at 414.
129. Id. at 451, 558 A.2d at 413.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 458, 558 A.2d at 417.
132. Id.
133. 107 Md. App. 91, 666 A.2d 1298 (1995).
134. Friedman & Fuller, 107 Md. App. at 91, 666 A.2d at 1299. The employee
failed to satisfy the promise to modify the employment agreement to include a provision on trade secrets and a non-competition clause. Id. at 9798, 666 A.2d at 1301-02.
135. Id. at Ill, 666 A.2d at 1308.
136. Id. In order for promissory estoppel to prevail, the court stated that the
following five elements must be met: "[1] the promise was fraudulently
made, [2] the promisor anticipated that the promisee would rely on the
oral promise, [3] the reliance was reasonable, [4] the promisee engaged in
acts unequivocally referable to the oral promise, and [5] the promisee suffered substantial injury as a result of [the] reliance." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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trial court's granting of summary judgment for the defendant. 137
These two cases illustrate the inconsistency and confusion of Maryland appellate courts as to the requirements of promissory
estoppel. 138
B.

Courts' Application of Promissory Estoppel to the Construction Industry
Bidding Process

Maryland courts may alleviate the unique problems associated with
the construction bidding process by using the doctrine of promissory
estoppel. 139 Problems occur when no traditional contract has been
formed, usually for lack of an acceptance, but when all parties rely on
one another and one party suffers a loss because of an unmet expectation.140 Promissory estoppel is a legal fiction created to remedy situations where no formal contract exists,141 and acts to fill the void and
protect the parties from the potential risk of financial 10ss.142
1.

Original Refusal to Apply Promissory Estoppel

The first major case addressing the application of promissory estoppel to the relationship between general contractors and subcontractors is James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc. 143 There, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the general contractor's contention that the subcontractor should be held to his bid under the
doctrine of promissory estoppel. 144 Instead, applying traditional contract law, the court held that no contract existed, because the subcontractor's initial offer was withdrawn before acceptance occurred. 145
137. [d. at 112, 666 A2d at 1309.
138. Pavel Enters., Inc. v. AS. Johnson Co., 342 Md. 143, 166, 168-69,674 A2d
521,532534 (1995) (attempting to address this confusion and refusing to
include an element of fraudulent conduct in the court's adoption of the
Restatement (Second)).
139. See id. For alternative remedies to these problems see Part IV.
140. SWEET, supra note 2, at 388.
141. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
142. See infra Part III.B.2-3.
143. 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
144. [d. at 346.
145. [d. at 345. The court noted that it was possible for the parties to make a
contract with the understanding that the contractor would accept the subcontractor's bid by submitting the contractor's bid for the entire project.
[d. at 346. Here, however, the bid was not accepted upon use of the quote
by the general contractor, as it contained the phrase'" [i]f successful in
being awarded this contract, [they] will be absolutely guaranteed, ... and
... we are offering these prices for reasonable' (sic), 'prompt acceptance
after the general contract has been awarded.'" [d. at 345.
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In Baird, the plaintiff, a general contractor bidding on the construction of a government building, relied on the defendant-subcontractor's bid of December 24, 1932, to supply linoleum at a specified
price. 146 After realizing its employee underestimated the total
amount of linoleum needed for the project by about one-half the correct amount, the defendant-subcontractor withdrew its bid on December 28, 1932.147 This withdrawal reached the plaintiff only after it
submitted its main bid based in part on the linoleum price quoted by
the defendant. 148 Two days after receiving the general contractor's
bid, the soliciting party awarded the job to the plaintiff. 149 When the
defendant refused to perform, the plaintiff filed suit. 150
Judge Learned Hand, writing for the court, reasoned that because
the submission of a bid by the subcontractor was only an offer to contract, a subcontractor could withdraw the offer at any time before the
general contractor's acceptance. 151 The court refused to apply the
doctrine of promissory estoppel, stating that it had no application in a
commercial context where "an offer for an exchange is not meant to
become a promise until a consideration has been received."152 Promissory estoppel was only applicable to donative promises where the
promisor did not expect an equivalent promise in return. 153 Where
the subcontractor offered to deliver linoleum only in exchange for
146. Id. The defendant sent an offer to supply all the linoleum required to

147.

148.
149.

150.
151.
152.

153.

twenty or thirty general contractors it thought would be bidding on the
main project. Id.
Id. The defendant withdrew its bid by telegraphing all the general contractors to whom it had sent estimates stating that the quoted price was a mistake and that the actual price would be much higher. Id.
Id.
Id. Before this acceptance the defendant also wrote a letter confirming its
withdrawal. Id.
James Baird Co., 64 F.2d at 345. The plaintiff sued under breach of contract
since the defendant declined to recognize the existence of a contract. Id.
Id. at 346.
Id. The court wrote that promissory estoppel was primarily used to enforce
charitable pledges and did not apply in the case at bar. Id. At the time of
this decision, most jurisdictions followed the notion that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel only applied to charitable pledges where no consideration was present. See CAi.AMARI & PERILLO, supra note 59, § 6-1; see also. supra
note 106 and accompanying text.
James Baird Co., 64 F.2d at 346. Offers are ordinarily made in exchange for
some sort of consideration; however, a person may make a promise without
expecting one in return. Id. The court reasoned that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel only applied in such donative situations where the
promisee relied on the promise. Id.
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the general contractor's acceptance and payment for it,154 there was
no room for promissory estoppel. 155 The court reasoned that for it to
hold otherwise "would be to hold the offeror [to the contract] regardless of the stipulated condition of his offer."156 Thus, the Baird court
barred the use of promissory estoppel as a method to hold the subcontractor to a bid. 157
Unless the general contractor formally accepted the subcontractor's
bid, this decision left both parties unprotected in the bidding process. 158 By allowing the subcontractor to withdraw from a bid even
after the general contractor relied upon the quote to formulate its
own bid, general contractors risk being bound to an agreement based
on the price of a subcontractor who refuses to perform. 159 Under
Baird, the subcontractor is also exposed to significant risk because the
general contractor, after the award of the contract, is free to negotiate

154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.; see also supra note 145 and accompanying text.
James Baird Co., 64 F.2d at 346.
Id.
Id. The court also refused to regard the offer as an option allowing the
general contractor the right to accept the sub-bid if it was awarded the
main bid. Id. Nevertheless, the court conceded that, if an option were
found, the doctrine of promissory estoppel might apply. Id.
158. Id. The general contractor could protect itself before the award of the subcontract, however, by use of a bond or option contract. Franklin M. Schultz, The Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of Business Practice in the Construction
Industry, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 237, 262-63 (1952).
159. Schultz, supra note 158, at 239 ("If the subcontractor revokes his bid before
it is accepted by the general [contractor], any loss which results is a deduction from the general[] [contractor's] profit and conceivably may transform overnight a profitable contract into a losing deal."); see also F.B.
Reynolds v. Texarkana Constr. Co., 374 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Ark. 1964) (criticizing the Baird rule and stating that the party who commits the mistake
should bear any resulting loss).
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for lower bids from other subcontractors. 160 Although this opinion
was widely criticized,161 it remained influential. 162
2.

The First Use of Promissory Estoppel to Protect Parties in the Bidding Process

Partly in response to the cntlclsm of Baird,163 the California Supreme Court addressed the potential unfairness of that decision in
Drennan v. Star Paving Co. 164 In Drennan, the court held that, where a
paving subcontractor submitted a bid to the general contractor, the
general contractor's reliance on the subcontractor's bid made it
irrevocable. 165
The plaintiff, a general contractor, received a bid by phone from
the defendant, a subcontractor, to perform the paving work on a project. 166 Relying on the defendant's quote in computing its own bid,
the plaintiff submitted the main bid and was eventually awarded the

160. For a discussion of bid shopping and bid peddling, see supra Part II.B. See
also Closen & Weiland, supra note 29, at 583 (noting that under Baird, while
bound by his offer to the soliciting party, the general contractor is not
bound to any specific subcontractor and may, after being awarded the contract, bid shop among other subcontractors before awarding the subcontract). Nonetheless, it could be argued that although entailing risk, this
creates a necessary balance between general contractors and subcontractors
because, under Baird, neither party is bound by the initial offer. Kenneth L.
Schriber, Note, Construction Contracts-The Problem of Offer and Acceptance in
the General Contractor-Subcontractor Relationship, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 798,812-13
(1968) .
161. See, e.g., James G. Martin, N, Note, Contracts-Promissory Estoppel, 20 VA. L.
REv. 214 (1933); Schultz, supra note 158, at 242-43.
162. See Tatsch v. Hamilton-Erickson Mfg. Co., 418 P.2d 187, 189 (N.M. 1966)
(holding that a builder's reliance upon an offer in preparing his prime
construction bid did not amount to an acceptance or constitute promissory
estoppel).
163. See supra notes 161 and accompanying text.
164. 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958).
165. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 759-60. Reliance on the bid made it irrevocable as
long as the bid was silent with respect to the subcontractor's right to revoke, and the general contractor used the bid in making its own successful
bid on the project. Id.
166. Id. at 758. The plaintiff testified that it was customary in the trade for general contractors to receive bids from subcontractors by telephone and subsequently rely upon them in computing their bid for the contract. Id.; see
also supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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contract. 167 Unlike in Baird, where the offer was revoked before the
main bid was awarded,168 the defendant in Drennan informed the
plaintiff that there was a mistake in the bid and that the quoted price
was too low only after the general contract had been awarded. 169 This
attempt to revoke occurred, however, before the general contractor's
acceptance of the sub-bid. 170 As a result, the plaintiff was forced to
use another subcontractor to complete the paving and ultimately paid
the difference between the original bid and the substitute bid. 171
The court found that there was neither an option contract supported by consideration nor a binding bilateral contract. 172 Nonetheless, the court, relying on section 90 of the Restatement (First), 173 stated
that defendant's bid constituted a promise to perform. 174 Although
Judge Rodger Traynor, writing for the court, most likely agreed with
Hand's argument that section 90 has no application in a bargained for
exchange, the court found, through analogy to section 45 of the Restatement (First), 175 an implied subsidiary promise not to revoke the
bid. 176 The court stated that:
167. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 758. The plaintiff relied on the defendant's sub-bid in
computing its main bid because the defendant's bid for the paving portion
of the project was the lowest bid submitted. Id.
168. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
169. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 758-59. The general contractor was informed of the
mistake in the bid when he stopped by the subcontractor's office after being awarded the project contract. Id. at 758.
170. Id. at 758-59. It could be argued, however, that the general contractor was
in the act of accepting the sub-bid when the defendant revoked the offer.
171. Id. at 759. The difference between defendant's offer and the cost of using a
substitute paving subcontractor was $3,817. Id.
172. Id. The defendant contended, much like in Baird, that there was no enforceable contract on the ground that the defendant made a revocable offer and withdrew it before the plaintiff accepted. Id. As in Baird, the
Drennan court found that no option contract or bilateral contract existed.
Id. There was "no evidence that defendant offered to make its bid irrevocable in exchange for plaintiff's use of its figures in computing his bid." Id.
Nor was it shown that the plaintiff's use of the bid was an acceptance binding the plaintiff to award the defendant the subcontract, in the event the
plaintiff received the main contract. Id.
173. See supra note 77.
174. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 759.
175. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACfS § 45 (1932). Section 45 states: "[iJfan
offer for a unilateral contract is made, and part of the consideration requested in the offer is given or tendered by the offeree in response thereto,
the offeror is bound by a contract ... .n Id.
176. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 760. The court was able to overcome Baird by analogizing this situation to a unilateral contract. Id. at 759. Under section 45 of
the Restatement (First), if part of the consideration is given in response to a
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When plaintiff used defendant's offer in computing his own
bid, he bound himself to perform in reliance on defendant's
terms. Though defendant did not bargain for this use of its
bid neither did defendant make it idly, indifferent to
whether it would be used or not. On the contrary, . . .
[d]efendant had reason not only to expect plaintiff to rely
on its bid but to want him to. Clearly defendant had a stake
in plaintiff's reliance on its bid. Given this interest and the
fact that plaintiff is bound by his own bid, it is only fair that
plaintiff should have at least an opportunity to accept defendant's bid after the general contract has been awarded to
him. 177
The court overcame the absence of consideration by substituting
for it reliance on an implied promise to keep the bid open for a reasonable period of time. 178 Promissory estoppel was used, not as a consideration substitute for the formation of a contract or the invited
acceptance, but as consideration for an implied promise not to revoke
the bid. 179 Judge Traynor ·was able to create this implied promise by
melding together sections 90 180 and 45 181 of the Restatement (First).182
Therefore, unlike in Baird, the court held the subcontractor to its bid
by making the bid irrevocable. 183
By deliberately rejecting Baird and the reasoning ofJudge Hand,184
Drennan paved the way for applying promissory estoppel to construcunilateral contract, the offeror is bound to the contract. Id. at 759 (quoting
§ 45). The court noted that under section 45 comment b, the "main offer includes a subsidiary promise, necessarily implied, that if part of the requested performance is given, the offeror
will not revoke his offer, and that if tender is made it will be accepted." Id.
at 760 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 45 cmt. b). Therefore, whether implied in law or fact, the subsidiary promise precludes the
injustice which would result if the offeror could withdraw the offer even
after the offeree had detrimentally relied upon it. Id.
Id. The court noted, however, that the general contractor is not free to bid
shop once the general contract has been awarded, nor can the general contractor attempt to bargain with the subcontractor for a better deal while at
the same time claim a continuing right to accept the original offer of the
subcontractor. Id.
Id. This principle is now expressed in section 87(2) of the Restatement (Second). See supra note 90.
Drennan, 333 P.2d at 760. The bid was found to be irrevocable even though
the offer was silent as to revocation. Id. at 759-60.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
See supra note 175.
Drennan, 333 P.2d at 759-60.
Id. at 757.
See supra notes 175-82 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS

177.

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
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tion transactions. 185 This new application afforded the general contractor protection from a subcontractor who attempted to revoke a
sub-bid after the general contractor had already justifiably relied on it
in computing and submitting the main bid. 186 Although the court did
note that a general contractor is not permitted to delay acceptance or
reopen bargaining with the subcontractor in order to obtain a better
price,187 the court's holding placed the general contractor in a
stronger position than subcontractors. 188
3.

Other Jurisdictions' Use of Promissory Estoppel in Construction
Bidding Disputes

All jurisdictions in the United States have adopted and currently
apply some form of promissory estoppel, usually grounded in section
90 of the Restatement. 189 The Drennan decision was widely followed by
other jurisdictions. 190 The exact form of this reliance theory, how185. See Murphy, supra note 58, at 393.
186. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 759-60.
187. Id. at 760. The court noted, in what arguably could be dictum, that a general contractor cannot delay acceptance once the contract has been
awarded in order to get a better price, nor can the general contractor reopen bargaining with a subcontractor after accepting the original offer. Id.;
see also supra Part I1.B.
188. See Katz, supra note 96, at 1277 (stating that general contractors are overprotected under the Drennan decision).
189. See Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 WILLAME'ITE L.
REv. 263, 265 (1996). Although some critics say promissory estoppel is waning, many jurisdictions have adopted it. Id. In fact both Georgia and Louisiana have gone even further and adopted promissory estoppel by statute.
See GA. CODE ANN. § 13-3-44 (1982); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1967 (West
1987).
190. See Preload Tech., Inc. v. A.B. &]. Constr. Co., 696 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir.
1983); C. R. Fedrick, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852 (9th Cir.
1977); N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir.
1963); Janke Constr. Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 386 F. Supp. 687 (W.D.
Wis. 1974); Alaska Bussell Elec. Co. v. Vern Hickel Constr. Co., 688 P.2d
576 (Alaska 1984); Saliba-Kringlen Corp. v. Allen Eng'r Co., 92 Cal. Rptr.
799 (Cal. 1971); Southern Cal. Acoustics Co. v. C.V. Holder, Inc., 79 Cal.
Rptr. 319 (Cal. 1969); Norcross v. Winters, 25 Cal. Rptr. 821 (Cal. 1962);
C.H. Leavell & Co. v. Graffe & Assoc., Inc. 414 P.2d 873 (Idaho 1966); Pavel
Enters., Inc. v. A.S.Johnson Co., 342 Md. 143,674 A.2d 521 (1996); Loranger Constr. Corp. v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 374 N.E.2d 306 (Mass. App. Ct.
1978); Constructors Supply Co. v. Bostrom Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 190
N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1971); LAHR Constr. Corp. v.]. Kozel & Son, Inc., 640
N.Y.S.2d 957 (N.Y. Sup. 1996); Arango Constr. Co. v. Success Roofing, Inc.,
730 P.2d 720 (Wash. App. Div. 1986).
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ever, varies from state to state. 191 In searching for the correct standard to apply in Maryland, it is helpful to examine how other
jurisdictions have applied sections 90 and 87(2) 192 of the Restatement
(Second) in construction industry bidding disputes.
a.

The Majority's Use of Promissory Estoppel: Adopting Drennan Instead of
Baird

In a large number of states, promissory estoppel is used as a substitute for consideration in order to make a sub-bid irrevocable. 19g For
example, in Alaska Bussell Electric Co. v. Vern Hickel Construction CO.,194
the Supreme Court of Alaska adopted the Drennan rationale for applying promissory estoppel. 195 There, the plaintiff, a general contractor,
sued the defendant, an electrical subcontractor, for revoking a sub-bid
as the result of an error in computation for the building of a commissary for the United States Air Force at Elmendorf. 196 Although the
court recognized the risk to subcontractors of broadly applying promissory estoppel/ 97 it wrote that "we believe Drennan is better case law
than Baird."19s The court noted that, as applied in Drennan, promissory estoppel has the effect of encouraging subcontractors to take
191. See generally Holmes, supra note 189, at 297-514 (giving a comprehensive
jurisdiction-byjurisdiction analysis of promissory estoppel).
192. It is important to note, however, that no jurisdiction in reaching a decision
on a construction industry bidding dispute has solely applied section 87 (2)
of the Restatement (Second). See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
Rather, a majority of states apply the reasoning behind Drennan, while citing both sections 90 and 87 (2) of the Restatement (Second). See supra notes
104-05.
193. See, e.g., Air Conditioning Co. v. Richards Constr. Co., 200 F. Supp. 167,
170-71 (D. Haw. 1961); Reynolds v. Texarkana Constr. Co., 374 S.W.2d 818,
820 (Ark. 1964); Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 760 (Cal. 1958);
see also supra note 190 and accompanying text.
194. 688 P.2d 576 (Alaska 1984).
195. [d. at 579-80. Although the court adopted the Drennan rationale, the decision was different in that the jury did not award expectation damages. [d.
at 581-82. The jury apparently only wanted to award damages for the actual
harm incurred to the general contractor, that is, reliance damages.
Holmes, supra note 189, at 307.
196. Alaska Bussell Ekc. Co., 688 P.2d at 577-78. The defendant had informed the
plaintiff as to the omission of the cost of site work after the plaintiff was
informed it was the lowest bidder, but before the contract was officially
awarded to the plaintiff. [d. at 577.
197. [d. at 580.
198. [d. The court described the Baird decision as the narrower view and the
Drennan decision as setting forth a broader application of promissory estoppel to the construction bidding context. [d. at 579-80.
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greater care when formulating their sub-bids, thereby avoiding errors.199 This application of promissory estoppel, the court wrote, benefits the needs of the modem construction industry bidding
process. 200
Similarly, in the 1964 case of Reynolds v. Texarkana Construction
CO.,201 the Arkansas Supreme Court applied section 90 where the general contractor relied on the sub-bid in computing its main bid. 202
There the plaintiff, relying on a bid from the defendant for electrical
work, was the successful bidder for a school construction project. 203
The defendant, however, refused to perform because of an error in
computation. 204 Applying section 90 of the Restatement as a substitute
for a lack of consideration,205 the court found the sub-bid irrevocable. 206 The court reasoned that "[j]ustice demands that the loss resulting from the subcontractor's carelessness should fall upon him
who was guilty of the error rather than upon the [general] contractor
who relied in good faith upon the offer that he received."207
Even the forum state of the Baird decision has since adopted promissory estoppel when deciding construction bidding disputes. 208 As a
result of Baird, promissory estoppel had no application to commercial
transactions in New York, such as construction industry bidding disputes. 209 Subsequent New York cases, however, repudiated this restriction. 210 The New York Supreme Court, in James King & Sons v.
DeSantis Construction,211 specifically rejected the Baird opinion and
held a subcontractor liable in damages, under the doctrine of promis199. [d. at 580.
200. [d. The court went on to label promissory estoppel, as adopted in Drennan,
a necessary element in the scheme of construction industry bidding. [d.
201. 374 S.W.2d 818 (Ark. 1964).
202. [d. at 819-20.
203. [d. at 819.
204. [d. Specifically, the subcontractor overlooked the cost of the fixtures required for the project. [d. The defendant's refusal to perform compelled
the plaintiff to hire another electrical subcontractor at an amount in excess
of the defendant's bid. [d.
205. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
206. Reynolds, 374 S.W.2d at 820.
207. [d.
208. SeeJames King & Son v. DeSantis Constr., 413 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1977). The elements of promissory estoppel in New York are: (1) a clear
and unambiguous promise; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise
was made; (3) reliance that is both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the
party asserting promissory estoppel must be injured by the reliance. [d.
209. See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text analyzing the Baird opinion.
210. See, e.g., James King & Son, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
211. 413 N.Y.S.2d 78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
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sory estoppel, to a contractor who relied on the subcontractor's bid in
formulating its main bid. 212 Nonetheless, New York's highest court
has yet to specifically adopt section 90 as an independent claim for
relief. 213
b.

The Minority's Strict Use of Promissory Estoppel to Extend Protection to All
Parties

In response to the criticism that Drennan left the subcontractor exposed to risk,214 other jurisdictions have strictly construed promissory
estoppel and refused to apply it if the general contractor demonstrates a lack of reliance by bid shopping.215 For example, recognizing the equitable basis for the doctrine of promissory estoppel, Texas
courts do not apply it to bidding disputes if the general contractor is
found guilty of bid shopping after being awarded the main contract
and before accepting a subcontract. 216 In Sipco Services Marine, Inc. v.
Wyatt Field Service CO.,217 the court reasoned that this practice is evidence of a failure to rely and leaves the general contractor with "unclean hands."218
This approach is also taken by Utah, which does not apply the doctrine if the general contractor bid shops for a better deal after being
awarded the main contract or engages in bid chiseling with subcontractors. 219 This was advocated by Judge Traynor in dictum 220 and is
212.
213.
214.
215.

216.
217.
218.
219.

220.

Id. at 8l.
Holmes, supra note 189, at 266 n.2.
See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Sipco Servs. Marine, Inc. v. Wyatt Field Servo Co., 857 S.W.2d 602,
605-06 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the general contractor had not
waived its claim of promissory estoppel against the subcontractor'by soliciting bids from other subcontractors because changes in the project and
lapse of time had occurred since the original sub-bid); RJ. Daum Constr.
CO. V. Child, 247 P.2d 817, 823 (Utah 1952) (stating that where a general
contractor, who created the main contract on the basis of a subcontractor's
sub-bid, has submitted counteroffers to other subcontractors, the original
subcontractor is not barred by the doctrine of promissory estoppel from
denying the main contract); see also supra Part II.B.
See Sipco Seros. Marine, Inc., 857 S.W.2d at 605-06; see also supra Part II.B.
857 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
Id. at 606.
See RJ Daum Constr. Co., 247 P.2d at 823 (explaining that the general contractor's proposed written contract to the subcontractor was a counteroffer
and not an acceptance of the subcontractor's bid).
If the language of Drennan is strictly construed, then the general contractor
would not be free to bid shop once the contract has been awarded since
this would negate any alleged reliance. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.

2000]

Construction Industry Bidding Disputes

197

probably the best method to extend the protection of promissory estoppel to both the general contractor and to subcontractors as well. 221
c.

Two States' Use of Promissory Estoppel Only as a Defensive Theory

The highest courts of North Carolina and Virginia also have not
expressly adopted promissory estoppel to grant relief. 222 For example, in North Carolina, as the result of a lower court's attempt to arrest the development of promissory estoppel, a very different
approach is taken than in most other states. 223 The North Carolina
Court of Appeals refused to extend promissory estoppel to bind a subcontractor to its bid based on the general contractor's reliance on that
bid. 224 The court stated:
[0] ur courts have never recognized promissory estoppel as a
substitute for consideration .... Cases which have applied
the doctrine have done so in a defensive situation, where
there has been an intended abandonment of an existing
right by the promisee. North Carolina case law has not approved the doctrine for affirmative relief. 225
This decision may discourage parties from pleading promissory estoppel;226 however, the doctrine does exist as a defensive theory227
and whether it applies to construction cases will not be finalized until
the North Carolina Supreme Court addresses the issue.

C.

Maryland's Attempt to Use Promissory Estoppel in the Construction Bidding Context

Maryland cases that address the use of promissory estoppel in construction bidding disputes are sparse. 228 Before 1996, Maryland
courts had neither addressed the issue of when a subcontractor's offer
221. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
222. Holmes, supra note 189, at 265 n.2.
223. See Home Elec. Co. of Lenoir, Inc. v. Hall & Underdown Heating & Air
Conditioning Co., 358 S.E.2d 539, 541 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), affd per curiam
without opinion, 366 S.E.2d 441 (N.C. 1988) (noting that North Carolina
courts do not recognize the doctrine of promissory estoppel in all
situtations) .
224. Home Elec. Co., 358 S.E.2d at 541.
225. [d.
226. See, e.g., Labarre v. Duke Univ., 393 S.E.2d 321, 324 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990)
(noting that the parties to the case did not attempt to argue that promissory estoppel could be used as a substitute for consideration to enforce a
doctor's gratuitous promise).
227. Holmes, supra note 189, at 427.
228. For a description of Maryland cases using promissory estoppel in other circumstances see supra Part III.A.4.
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and a general contractor's acceptance form a binding contract,229 nor
had they addressed the application of promissory estoppel to such a
situation. 230 Maryland law does permit a general contractor to accept
a subcontractor's bid before the general contractor is awarded the
main contract by the soliciting party.231 If, however, acceptance of the
sub-bid has not occurred, parties need not honor their offers unless
another method, such as promissory estoppel, is applied. 232
1.

Pavel Enterprises

In an apparent attempt to clarifY the exact status of promissory estoppel in Maryland,233 the court of appeals in Pavel Enterprises, Inc. v.
A.S. Johnson CO. 234 explicitly adopted the Restatement (Second) oj Contracts for application in construction industry bidding disputes. 235 Mter reviewing the construction bidding process,236 providing a
historical overview of the cases dealing with its problems237 and explaining the doctrine of promissory estoppel in Maryland,23B the court
held the evidence insufficient to establish the general contractor's
detrimental reliance on the sub-bid. 239
229. See, e.g., Pavel Enters., Inc. v. AS. Johnson Co., 342 Md. 143, 152,674 A2d
521,526 (1995).
230. [d. at 163, 674 A2d at 531 (recognizing that nothing in previous cases suggests that the doctrine of promissory estoppel was intended to be limited to
specific instances).
231. See, e.g., Maryland Supreme Corp. v. Blake Co., 279 Md. 531, 540-41, 369
A2d lO17, lO24-25 (1977). There, the court of appeals found a valid acceptance by the general contractor of the subcontractor's offer even
though the main contract had not been awarded to the general contractor.
[d. The court also noted that the question of whether an offer is of a type
that can be converted into a contract of sale upon its acceptance is dependent upon the intention of the parties and therefore depends on the facts
and circumstances of a particular case. [d. at 540, 369 A2d at 1024.
232. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
233. See supra Part III.A4.
234. 342 Md. 143,674 A2d 521 (1996).
235. [d. at 166, 674 A2d at 532.
236. [d. at 152, 674 A2d at 525-26.
237. [d. at 152-58, 674 A.2d at 526-29.
238. [d. at 164-67, 674 A.2d at 531-33.
239. /d. at 168-69, 674 A2d at 534. The court also affirmed the trial court's
holding that recovery by the general contractor was not justified under
traditional bilateral contract theory. [d. at 162, 674 A2d at 531. The trial
court had rejected PEl's claim of a bilateral contract because there was no
meeting of the minds, and the offer was withdrawn before acceptance occurred. [d.
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The facts of Pavel Enterprises are typical of most construction bidding
disputes resulting from subcontractor error. 240 In Pavel Enterprises, the
National Institute of Health (NIH) solicited bids for a renovation project241 and Pavel Enterprises, Inc. (PEl), a general contractor, relying
on solicited sub-bids from various subcontractors, placed a main bid
for the project. 242 One of the subcontractors on which PEl relied was
A.S. Johnson Co. ('Johnson"), a mechanical subcontractor, who submitted a written scope proposal for the heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning portion of the project, but had omitted the price. 243 As
is the practice in the construction industry, Johnson waited until the
last day before PEl submitted its main bid to call and verbally submit a
price. 244
When the general contractors' bids were opened on August 5, 1993,
PEl's bid was the second lowest. 245 Mter disqualifying the lowest bidder, the government notified PEl in mid-August that its bid would be
accepted. 246 On August 26, 1993, Thomas Pavel, president of PEl,
met with James Kirk,Johnson's chief estimator, to become acquainted
with the company's operations. 247 Mter the meeting, PEl sent a fax to
all mechanical subcontractors informing them that PEl would be
awarded the contract from NIH.248
On September 1, 1993, PEl mailed and faxed a letter to Johnson
formally accepting the sub-bid. 249 Upon receipt of the fax, Johnson
called PEl to inform them that the bid contained an error and, as a
240. See supra notes 14&-50, 16&-71 and accompanying text.
241. Pavel Enters., Inc., 342 Md. at 146, 674 A.2d at 523. The proposed work
entailed demolition and mechanical work, including heating, ventilation,
and air conditioning. Id. at 146-47, 674 A.2d at 523.
242. Id. PEl solicited bids from a number of mechanical subcontractors, one of
which was the defendant. Id.
243. Pavel Enters., Inc., 342 Md. at 147, 674 A.2d at 523.
244. Id. It is common practice in the construction industry for the subcontractor's bid amount to be entered immediately before the general contractor
submits the main bid to the owner. Id.; see also id. at 147 n.2, 674 A.2d at
523 n.2. Johnson's verbal quote was $898,000 for the heating, ventilation,
and air conditioning portion, which PEl then used in computing its own
bid of $1,585,000 for the entire project. Id.; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text. This custom protects the subcontractor from a general
contractor who intends to shop for a lower sub-bid. See supra Part II.B.
245. Pavel Enters., Inc., 342 Md. at 147, 674 A.2d at 523.
246. Id. This was a few weeks after the date when the general contractors' bids
were originally opened. Id.
247. Id. at 147-48, 674 A.2d at 524.
248. Id. at 148, 674 A.2d at 524.
249. Id. at 149, 674 A.2d at 524. This fax was sent after PEl had informed NIH
that Johnson was to be the mechanical subcontractor on the project. Id.
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result, the quoted price was too low. 250 According to the estimating
manager at Johnson who testified at trial, the mistake had been discovered earlier, but because they believed that PEl had not been
awarded the contract, they felt no duty to correct the error. 251 Johnson attempted to immediately withdraw its bid, but PEl refused. 252
On September 28, 1993, NIH formally awarded the construction contract to PEl, requiring them to find a substitute subcontractor to complete the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning work, resulting in
financial loss.253
The trial court held that there was no bilateral contract between
PEl and Johnson because PEl failed to make a timely and valid acceptance of Johnson's offer. 254 The trial court also rejected PEl's claim of
promissory estoppel. 255 PEl appealed this decision under traditional
contract theory of offer and acceptance and the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 256
In response to PEl's promissory estoppel claim, the court of appeals
applied Restatement (Second) section 90(1).257 Instead of adhering to
the text of the Restatement, however, the court transformed section 90
into a four-part test. 258 This reformulated test required:
(1) a clear and definite promise; (2) where the promisor has
a reasonable expectation that the offer will induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee; (3) which does induce actual and reasonable action or forbearance by the
250.
251.
252.
253.

254.

255.
256.

257.

258.

Id. at 150, 674 A.2d at 524.
Id.
Id. at 150-51, 674 A.2d at 524-25.
Pavel Enters., Inc., 342 Md. at 151, 674 A.2d at 525. PEl subsequently
brought suit against Johnson to recover $32,000, the difference between
the original sub-bid and the cost of the substitute subcontractor. Id.
Id. at 161,674 A.2d at 530. The theory endorsed by the trial court was that
Johnson's sub-bid was an offer of a contingent contract which PEl accepted
on September 1 "subject to the condition precedent" of NIH awarding the
contract to PEl. Id. at 163, 674 A.2d at 531. Therefore, prior to the occurrence of the condition precedent Johnson was free to withdraw. Id.
Id. at 164, 674 A.2d at 531. This doctrine was applicable if PEl had detrimentally relied on the sub-bid. Id.
Id. at 151, 674 A.2d at 525. Although PEl initially appealed the decision of
the court of special appeals, the court of appeals issued a writ of certiorari
before the lower appellate court could consider the case. Id.
Id. at 166, 674 A.2d at 532. The court stated that by adopting the Restatement (Second), it was ridding Maryland jurisprudence of the confusion surrounding the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Id.; see also supra notes 12138 and accompanying text.
Id. at 166, 674 A.2d at 532.
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promisee; and (4) causes a detriment which can only be
avoided by the enforcement of the promise. 259
Recognizing the existing confusion over the application of promissory estoppel, the court stated that to the extent past opinions required a showing of fraud on the part of the offeror, they were
disapproved. 260
Applying this new test to the facts of the case, the court agreed with
the trial court that the sub-bid was sufficiently clear and definite to
constitute an offer in satisfying the first element. 261 Under the second
element, however, the court found no error in the trial court's holding that due to the lapse of time between the opening of bidding and
the actual awarding of the contract, it was "unreasonable for the offer
to continue."262 In doing so, the court effectively added the extra requirement that the subcontractor's expectation that the general contractor rely on the sub-bid not dissipate over time. 263 Despite the trial
court's lack of findings of fact as to the third and fourth elements, the
court assumed and inferred that PEl did not rely on Johnson's bid264
259. Id. The court stated that this formulation comported with that in Union
Trust Co. of Maryland v. Charter Med. Cory., 663 F. Supp. 175, 178 (D. Md.
1986), where the United States District Court of Maryland held that a corporation, with whom the debtor was purportedly going to merge, could not
be held liable to the creditor under the theory of promissory estoppel
based on representations made at a meeting. Id. at 166 n.29, 674 A.2d at
533 n.29. See also supra note 84 and accompanying text for a description of
the Restatement's version of promissory estoppel.
260. Pavel Enters., Inc., 342 Md. at 166, n.29, 674 A.2d at 532-33, n.29; see also
supra notes 127-38 and accompanying text.
261. Pavel Enters., Inc., 342 Md. at 167, 674 A.2d at 533. The court noted that
determining whether a bid constitutes an offer is such a fact-specific judgment that it is best achieved by a case-by-case analysis. Id. In this case the
trial judge had found the bid to be an offer, and the court declined to hold
this finding to be clearly erroneous. Id.
262. Id. The court noted that "course of dealing" and "usage of trade" would
provide evidence of whether a subcontractor's expectations were reasonable. Id. at 167, n.30, 674 A.2d at 533, n.30.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 168, 674 A.2d at 533. In analyzing whether a party relied on a bid
under the third element, the court noted that: (1) the fact that a general
contractor engaged in bid shopping or encouraged bid peddling is evidence that the general contractor did not rely on the sub-bid; (2) prompt
notice by the general contractor to the subcontractor of an intent to use
the bid on a project is evidence that the general contractor relied on the
bid; and (3) the fact that a sub-bid is so low that a reasonably prudent general contractor would not rely upon it is evidence that the general contractor did not rely on the sub-bid. Id. The court assumed that the third
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and, therefore, the case did not merit an equitable remedy. 265 Al~
though the court adopted section 90 for use in construction cases,
because of the added requirement that the reliance not have a chance
to dissipate over time,266 PEl was not afforded a remedy for the su~
contractor's error. 267

2.

The Effects of Pavel Enterprises: Continued Confusion Surrounding
Promissory Estoppel in Construction Bidding Disputes

By incorrectly applying promissory estoppel as outlined in the Re~
statement (Second),268 this opinion by the court of appeals arguably returned Maryland to the law under Baird, where neither party was
protected. 269 Even though the court explicitly stated it was adopting
the Restatement for application in Maryland construction cases,270 its
failure to adhere to the Restatement diminishes the impact of its purported application and continues to add to the confusion surrounding promissory estoppel in Maryland. 271
First, the court deviated from the Restatement's explicit request that
section 87(2), rather than section 90, apply to construction bidding
disputes. 272 Section 87(2) was expressly intended to deal with these
types of disputes as a result of the controversy created by the Drennan
decision. 273 Nonetheless, the court ignored section 87(2) and focused solely on its reformulation of section 90 of the Restatement. 274

265.

266.
267.
268.

269.
270.
271.

272.
273.
274.

element was not met based on the trial judge's statement that" 'the parties
did not have a definite, certain meeting of the minds on a certain price for
a certain quantity of goods and wanted to renegotiate ... '" as evidenced by
PEl's August 26, 1993 fax to all mechanical subcontractors. Id. The court
further stated that although not clearly erroneous, the trial court's assumed
finding as to the third element was "indisputably a close call." Id.
Pavel Enters., Inc., 342 Md. at 168, 674 A.2d at 53~34. For the fourth element, to be demonstrated, the court stated a general contractor must have
'''clean hands.'" Id. In the instant case, because the trial court was silent,
the court inferred the absence of intent to permit an equitable remedy. Id.
Id. at 167, 674 A.2d at 533 (basing the decision on a failure of PEl to satisfy
the second element).
Id. at 167-69, 674 A.2d at 53~34.
For a detailed analysis of Pavel Enters., Inc. and extensive criticism of that
opinion, see Scherr, supra note 107. See also supra note 84 for the elements
of promissory estoppel under the Restatement (Second).
See supra notes 159~0 and accompanying text.
See supra note 235.
See supra notes 121~38 and accompanying text.
See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
Pavel Enters., Inc., 342 Md. at 166, 674 A.2d at 532.
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Second, the court inaccurately analyzed the holding of Drennan,
and thus failed to eliminate remaining uncertainty regarding the doctrine in Maryland. 275 The court expressly recognized that in Drennan,
promissory estoppel was not applied in its traditional function as a
consideration substitute for the entire contract; rather, it was used as
consideration for the subcontractor's implied subsidiary promise to
keep the bid open for a reasonable period of time. 276 This recognition is blurred by the court's subsequent statement that recovery in
Drennan was based on "traditional bilateral contract [theory], with the
sub-bid as the offer and promissory estoppel serving to replace acceptance."277 These two assertions are inconsistent. The interpretation
that promissory estoppel replaces acceptance is incongruous with the
rationale of Drennan. 278
IT the court of appeals was truly adopting Restatement (Second) section
90, it would have followed the application of section 90 in Drennan. 279
Accordingly, by submitting a bid, a subcontractor is deemed to have
reasonably expected the promise to induce action or forbearance, and
by using the sub-bid in the overall bid, the general contractor is
deemed to have relied. 280 This application of section 90, as enunciated in Drennan, would have resulted in a different outcome in Pavel
Enterprises.
Unlike in Drennan, where the sub-bid was accepted after the attempt
to revoke,281 the sub-bid in Pavel Enterprises was accepted before the
attempted revocation by the subcontractor. 282 Arguably, in such a scenario there is no need for promissory estoppel to hold the subcontractor's offer open. 283 Therefore, the facts in this case were not ideal for
the application of promissory estoppel. 284
Finally, the court's reformulation of section 90 added to the confusion of promissory estoppel jurisprudence in Maryland. Elements
three and four are facially consistent with the requirements and language of section 90, but the court imposed additional factors under
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

281.
282.
283.
284.

See supra notes 121-38 and accompanying text.
Pavel Enters., Inc., 342 Md. at 155, 674 A.2d at 527.
Id. at 155, 674 A.2d at 527.
See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 172-83 and accompanying text.
Reliance by the general contractor was present, as the trial court found that
"PEl relied upon Johnson'S sub-bid" in computing its bid for the entire
project. See Pavel Enters., Inc., 342 Md. at 151, 674 A.2d at 525.
See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.
See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
See Pavel Enters. Inc., 342 Md. at 164-67, 674 A.2d at 532-33.
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the first and second elements. 285 Section 90 requires that the promisor reasonably expect his promise to induce action or forbearance
and that the promise does induce such action or forbearance. 286 It
does not, as the court added, require an expectation of continued
reliance by the promisee. 287 Although the general contractor may not
rely upon the promise if bid shopping occurs,288 a requirement of
continued reliance by the general contractor is unnecessary289 and
runs contrary to the case law of other jurisdictions. 29o This additional
requirement makes promissory estoppel under certain circumstances
inapplicable as a protection against the risks encountered by subcontractors and general contractors. 291
The court's reformulation of section 90 also added an additional
requirement to element one, that the promise be of a "clear and definite" nature,292 something that does not exist in the Restatement
(Firstf93 or Restatement (Second).294 Accordingly, Maryland's application of section 90 is conditioned on a threshold finding of a "clear and
definite promise."295 This requirement diverges from the Restatement
(Second) definition of a promise, which only requires a manifestation
of intent to act or refrain from acting. 296 Requiring a "clear and definite promise" limits the applicability of promissory estoppel. 297 One
commentator noted that where the requisite promise is elevated to an
offer status, promissory estoppel is held inapplicable in most court
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

291.

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

297.

See supra notes 259, 262-63 and accompanying text.
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 177, 219-20 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.B.
See supra note 84.
Most other jurisdictions only require that the promisor reasonably expect
reliance and that the promisee's reliance is satisfied merely by the general
contractor's use of the subcontractor's bid. See supra Part II.B.3.a. for a
discussion of cases which follow Drennan.
See supra note 259 and accompanying text. Therefore, in certain situations,
application of this doctrine in Maryland will lead to the same result as
would a decision following Baird. See supra notes 151-60 and accompanying
text.
Pavel Enters. Inc., 342 Md. at 166, 674 A.2d at 532.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
If the first element is not satisfied there is no cause for the court to apply
the remaining elements of promissory estoppel. See supra note 259.
Holmes, supra note 189, at 286 (arguing that court's use of the heightened
standard of a "clear and definite promise" ignores the definiton of a promise in section 2 of the Restatement (Second).
Id.
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opinions. 298 Similarly, the two Maryland decisions after Pavel Enterprises that applied the reformulation never reached elements two,
three, and four, instead basing their decisions to reject promissory estoppel on a failure to find a "clear and definite promise."299
IV.

ALTERNATIVES

In the event the Court of Appeals of Maryland does not clarify the
application of promissory estoppel in construction bidding disputes,
there are three alternatives available to protect contractors. 300 These
alternatives, which also bind parties to their bids, arguably create just
as stable a construction industry bidding process as the correct application of promissory estoppe1. 301 These alternatives are the firm offer
provision,302 bid depositories,303 and the state bidding statutes. 304 Although these are viable alternatives, each has certain limitations. 305
Again, the best solution to Maryland's dilemma would be for the court
of appeals to clarify its holding in Pavel Enterprises. 306
A.

Firm Offer

One common suggestion is the application by analogy of the firm
offer provision as outlined in section 2-205 of the Uniform Commer298. Id.
299. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 122 Md. App. 295, 712 A,2d 132 (1998); Dunnaville v.
McCormick & Co., 21 F. Supp. 2d 527 (D. Md. 1998). In Doe, the court of
special appeals held, inter alia, that Mrs. Doe's promise to Mr. Doe that he
could rely on her stock holdings for retirement if he deposited his income
into a joint checking account was insufficient for a claim of promissory estoppel because the complaint "did not allege what [the defendant] meant
when she allegedly told [the plaintiff] he could 'rely' on her stockholdings
for his retirement .... " Doe, 122 Md. App. at 360, 712 A,2d at 164. Thus,
the court refused to enforce the promise because there was no "clear and
definite promise." Id. Also, in Dunnaville, the Federal District Court for the
District of Maryland, applying Maryland law, held that a prospective buyer
of a corporation's subsidiary could not maintain a claim against the corporation under the theory of promissory estoppel because the plaintiff could
not show that the defendant made "a clear and definite promise." Dunnaville, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 534.
300. See infra Part N.A-C.
301. See generally Michael Gibson, Promissory Estoppel, Article 2 of the V. e. e., and the
Restatement (Third) of Contracts, 73 IOWA L. REv. 659 (1988).
302. See infra Part N.A.
303. See infra Part N.B.
304. See infra Part N.C.
305. See infra notes 310-12, 321, 333-34 and accompanying text.
306. See supra Part III.C.2.
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cial Code (V.C.C.).307 This section makes a subcontractor's bid irrevocable if the offer is in a signed writing, which by its terms gives
assurance that it will be held open for a reasonable period of time. 308
The authors of this section believed that these two additional requirements to the traditional theory of promissory estoppel would eliminate some of the dangers the conventional doctrine imposed. 309
However, because the V.C.C. applies only to transactions in goods,310
section 2-205 cannot be applied to most construction bidding disputes, which essentially involve contracts for services. 311 Therefore,
only a few courts have considered the relevance of this section before
proceeding to apply promissory estoppe1. 312

B.

Bid Depositories
One alternative that has been developed by the construction indus-

try is bid depositories. 313 A bid depository is an organization created

by subcontractors and used by owners, contractors, and suppliers. 314
It is designed to facilitate the bidding process according to specified
307. V.C.C. § 2-205 (1999); see also MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-205 (1997)
(following the V.C.C. verbatim).
308. V.C.C. § 2-205; see also MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-205; Pavel Enters.,
Inc. v. A.S. Johnson Co., 342 Md. 143, 159-60, 647 A.2d 521, 529 (1995)
(recognizing the use of V.C.C. § 2-205 as an alternative to promissory
estoppel).
309. Gibson, supra note 301, at 703. The main reason for the requirement of a
writing was to eliminate the danger that an unscrupulous contractor would
falsely testify to receiving a sub-bid and subsequently claim to have relied
on that sub-bid. Id. The main reason for the requirement that the offer be
accepted in a reasonable time was that the use of reliance as an enforcement mechanism is decidedly one-sided, as it is easy for a general contractor to rely on a subcontractor's bid, but it is extremely difficult for a
subcontractor to use reliance against a general contractor. Id.
310. V.C.C. § 2-102 (1999) (stating that the Article applies to transactions in
goods, unless the context requires otherwise).
311. Joel R. Wolfson, Express Warranties and Published Information Content Under
Article 2B: Does the Shoe Fit?, 600 PU/Pat 317, 329 (2000). "Goods" are defined as "all things ... which are movable at the time of identification to
the contract for sale." V.C.C. § 2-105(1).
312. See, e.g., Janke Constr. Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 386 F. Supp. 687 (W.D.
Wis. 1974) (noting that the offer to supply pipes failed the requirements of
V.C.c. § 2-205 and instead was enforced on the basis of promissory estoppel); Pavel Enters., Inc., 342 Md. at 159-60, 674 A.2d at 529 (discussing
V.C.C. § 2-205, but applying promissory estoppel instead).
313. SWEET, supra note 2, at 626.
314. Id.; see also SAMUELS, supra note 23, at 72.
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ntles by which members must agree to abide. 315 These rules require
the orderly submission of bids by subcontractors to general contractors on a given date and prohibit subsequent price solicitations by all
parties. 316 Since subcontractors are required to file definitive sub-bids
prior to the general contractor's opening of these sub-bids, there is no
opportunity for "last minute haggling."317 Also, because any difference in price between the sub-bid and the price actually charged are
likely to be detected, post-award bid peddling is limited. 318 If the general contractor awards any sub-bids to subcontractors who did not file
with the depository, unsuccessful subcontractors can assume their bids
have been used for bid shopping and refuse to submit bids to that
contractor in the future. 3Ig Thus, nearly all depositories prohibit, by a
number of methods, such evils as bid shopping in the bidding process. 320 Although this alternative is extremely attractive, it is preventative, rather than remedial, has antitrust implications,321 and is of no
use once a bidding dispute has arisen outside of a depository.
C.

Statutory Rules

State legislatures have also responded to the construction industry
bidding dilemma by creating statutes that address the ills of bid shopping and bid peddling.322 Nineteen states have statutes which require
subcontractors to be listed on all bids for public construction
projects. 323 The statutes prohibit a general contractor from removing
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

SWEET, supra note 2, at 626.
George H. Schueller, Bid Depositories, 58 MICH. L. REv. 497, 498-99 (l960).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 499.
See SAMUELS, supra note 23, at 72-73.
For cases addressing the antitrust implications of such ventures see Tekton,
Inc. v. Builders Bid Service of Utah, Inc., 676 F.2d 1352 (lOth Cir. 1982) and
Cullum Electric & Mechanical, Inc. v. Mechanical Contractors Ass 'n of South Caro..
lina, 436 F. Supp. 418 (D. S.C. 1976).
322. See supra note 323; see also supra Part II.B.
323. See ALAsKA STAT. § 36.30.115 (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 22..9.. 204
(Michie Supp. 1999); CAL. PUB. CaNT. CODE § 4104 (West Supp. 2000);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4b-95 (West 1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29,
§§ 6911(1), 6904(b) (2) (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 255.0515 (West 1999);
HAw. REv. STAT. § 103D..302(b) (Supp. 1999); IDAHO CODE § 67..2310
(Supp. 2000); IOWA CODE ANN. § 18.6(13) (West Supp. 2000); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-3741 (Supp. 1999); NEV. REv. STAT. § 338.141 (Supp. 1999); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 40A:ll ..16 (West Supp. 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4-32 to
13-4-43 (Michie 2000); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAw § 1735 (McKinney 1999 &
Supp. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-128(b) (Supp. 1999); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 11 ..35..3020 (Law Co-op 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-6-119 (1997); UTAH
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or replacing a subcontractor listed in a bid for a state contract, subject
to certain exceptions. 324
For example, the California Legislature adopted the Subletting and
Subcontracting Fair Practices Act. 325 This Act provides that a general
contractor on "any public work or improvement" must put in its main
bid "the name and the location of the place of business of each subcontractor who will perform work ... in an amount in excess of onehalf of [one] percent" of the price of the main bid. 326 The general
contractor is also required to provide any other information requested by an officer, department board, or commission, concerning
any subcontractor who the general contractor is required to list. 327
Once a general contractor's bid on a public project has been accepted, the Act prohibits the general contractor from replacing any of
the listed subcontractors, subject to nine exceptions. 328 If a general

324.
325.

326.

327.
328.

CODE ANN. § 63A-5-208 (Michie Supp. 2000); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 39.30.060 (West 2000); see also Allen Holt Gwyn, A Review of SubcontractorListing Statutes, 17 CONSTRUCTION LAw 35 (1997) (listing the nineteen statutes and describing their requirements and differences).
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 255.0515. See also infra note 328 for a list of
usual exceptions.
See CAL. PUB. CaNT. CODE § 4101-14. The reason for the enactment of this
chapter was legislative findings that bid shopping and bid peddling can
"often result in poor quality of material and workmanship to the detriment
of the public, deprive the public of the full benefits of fair competition
among [general] contractors and subcontractors, and lead to insolvencies,
loss of wages to employees, and other evils." Id. at 4101; see also E.F. Brady
Co. v. M.H. Golden Co., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 890-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
(stating that the Act was created to prevent bid shopping by general contractors pressuring other subcontractors to submit lower bids and to prevent bid peddling by unlisted subcontractors attempting to undercut
known bids of listed subcontractors in order to obtain the sub-contract);
supra Part II.B.
CAL. PUB. CaNT. CODE § 4104(a)(1). In the case of bids for the construction of streets, highways, and bridges, however, the subcontractor's work
must either be in excess of one-half of one percent of the general contractor's total bid or in excess of $10,000, whichever is greater. Id. Also, no
more than one subcontractor may be listed for each portion of the work.
Id. § 4104(b). It is worth noting that the listing of a subcontractor, as required by the Act, does not create an express or implied contract between
the general contractor and the subcontractor. E.F Brady Co., 67 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 890.
See CAL. PUB. CaNT. CODE § 4104(a) (2) .
Id. § 4107. The awarding authority:
[M]ay consent to the substitution of the following [nine] situations: (1) When the subcontractor listed in the bid after having a
reasonable opportunity to do so fails or refuses to execute a written
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contractor violates these provisions, the awarding authority may cancel the contract or assess a penalty in an amount of not more than
10% of the subcontract in question. 329 The Supreme Court of California has additionally held that public authorities have a duty to listed
subcontractors not to consent to any wrongful substitutions of
subcon tractors. 330
Another state, New Mexico, has enacted the Subcontractors Fair
Practices Act, which substantially mirrors the California statute. 331
However, the New Mexico statute adds the unique requirement that
agencies employ alternative dispute resolution procedures to resolve
bid shopping and bid peddling claims. 332
contract, when the written contract ... is presented to the subcontractor by the ... [general] contractor; (2) When the listed subcontractor becomes bankrupt or insolvent; (3) When the listed
subcontractor fails or refuses to perform his or her subcontract; (4)
When the listed subcontractor fails or refuses to meet the bond
requirements of the ... [general] contractor ... ; (5) When the ...
[general] contractor demonstrates ... that the name of the subcontractor was listed as the result of an inadvertent clerical error;
(6) When the listed subcontractor is not licensed ... ; (7) When
the awarding authority ... determines that the work performed by
the listed subcontractor is substantially unsatisfactory . . . ; (8)
When the listed subcontractor is ineligible to work on a public
works project ... ; (9) When the awarding authority determines
that a listed subcontractor is not a responsible contractor.
[d.
329. [d. § 4110.
330. Southern Cal. Acoustics Co. v. C.V. Holder, Inc., 456 P.2d 975, 981 (Cal.
1969).
331. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4-31, 13-4-32, 13-4-34, 13-4-36 (Michie 1997); see
also supra notes 325-29 and accompanying text. Again, based on findings
that "the practice of bid shopping and bid peddling ... often result in poor
quality of material and workmanship to the detriment of the public, deprive the public of the full benefits of fair competition among contractors
and subcontractors and lead to insolvencies and loss of wages to employees," the Act prohibits a general contractor whose bid is accepted on any
public works construction project from substituting a subcontractor in
place of the subcontractor listed on the original bid. N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-4-32, 13-4-36. There are nine exceptions to this substitute prohibition. See id. § 13-4-36(A)(1)-(9). These nine exceptions follow almost verbatim the nine exceptions in the California statute. See supra note 328 and
accompanying text.
332. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4-43. The statute states that once a valid claim has
been established the agency may "(a) hold a public hearing for the purpose
of providing an informal resolution of the dispute by preparing a 'form of
dispute' which shall be available to all parties ... ; or (b) refer the matter in
dispute to be resolved through arbitration." [d.
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These laws offer a viable alternative to promissory estoppel. Nonetheless, these statutes only regulate construction contracts for public
projects,333 which are only a small percentage of overall construction
contracts. 3M Therefore, in order to fully remedy the construction bidding dilemma, the Maryland Legislature would have to create legislation applicable not only to public, but private construction contracts
as well.
V.

CONCLUSION

The construction industry's unique practices 335 lend themselves to
creative solutions. 336 Promissory estoppel has been applied by some
courts as an answer to dilemmas encountered in the construction industry bidding process. 337 The Court of Appeals of Maryland in 1996
took what appeared to be an opportunity to resolve confusion over
the doctrine of promissory estoppel and applied it as a creative solution to bidding disputes. 338 Because of continued confusion,339 however, Maryland, contrary to other jurisdictions,34o currently fails to
apply appropriately the doctrine of prommisory estoppeP41 and instead follows a misinterpretation of section 90. 342 The most appropriate forum to resolve this problem is the court of appeals. 343
Therefore, when confronted with the correct factual scenario, the
court must clarify its holding in Pavel Enterprises by applying the correct rationale for the Restatement's sections on promissory estoppe1. 344
Only through this clarification, or an alternative method,345 can a subcontractor's bid become irrevocable 346 and a general contractor be
prohibited from refusing to accept a sub-bid upon award of the main
333. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
334. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 720 (1999). Government construction contracts accounted for
22% of the $665 billion spent overall on construction in the United States
in 1998. [d.
335. See supra Part II.B.
336. See supra Part II1.B.
337. See supra Part II1.B.
338. See supra Part II1.c.l.
339. See supra Part II1.C.2.
340. See supra Part II1.B.3.a-b.
341. See supra Part II1A3.b, I1I.B.3.a-b.
342. See supra Part II1.C.1-2.
343. See supra Part IILC.2.
344. See supra Part IILC.2.
345. See supra Part IV.
346. See supra Part I1LB.3.b.
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contract. 347 This would level the playing field between these two parties and eliminate any continued exposure to risk. 348

Kai-Niklas A. Schneider

347. See supra Part III.B.3.a.
348. See supra Part III.B.

